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Economists have long questioned the
wisdom of attempting to achieve current-
account objectives through a monetary
manipulation of nominal exchange rates.
Nevertheless, this seems to be the ap-
proach of choice among many national
leaders. We refer to these attempts as
monetaiy protectionism to emphasize
their similarities with more traditional
types of protectionist policies, such as
tariffs and quotas.
Calls for monetary protectionism do
not stem from a clear, unequivocal
demonstration of market failure. They
grow instead from political institutions
and incentives that encourage those dis-
satisfied with the market's outcome to
supplant the automatic and nondis-
criminatory responses of markets with
the discretionary, politically motivated
decisions of governments.
This Economic Commentary explores
the political economy of monetary
protectionism in order to illustrate its
economic shortcomings and to under-
stand its political appeal. As a counter-
weight to the political pull toward
monetary protectionism, we recom-
mend that nations adopt monetary con-
stitutions, which focus monetary policy
on long-term price stability and recog-
nize market-determined exchange rates.
• The Mechanics of Monetary
Protectionism
To understand the mechanics of mone-
tary protectionism, consider the case of
a country with a balance-of-payments
deficit. Monetary protectionists would
call for an expansion of money growth,
which, other things being equal, would
produce a nominal currency deprecia-
tion. If individuals are unable to adjust
prices immediately, or if they are slow
in perceiving the inflationary aspects of
this policy, a real depreciation will
accompany the nominal depreciation.
The inflation rate eventually will
respond to the monetary expansion,
however, offsetting the nominal
depreciation and returning the real
exchange rate to its initial position.
Nevertheless, the tenuous, short-lived
relationship between money and the
real exchange rate is seductive enough
to convince politicians that monetary
policy can serve mercantilist designs.
Our focus on this issue stems from a
firm belief that central banks can do no
better than to guarantee long-run price
stability and that any compromises to
this guarantee will not improve
economic welfare. A central bank that
attempts to maintain price stability and
a nominal exchange-rate target has
more policy targets than policy instru-
ments. At times, these two objectives
may be compatible, but just as easily,
they can conflict, forcing a central bank
to trade one objective against the other.
Realizing the possible incompatibilities,
markets will view neither price stability
nor exchange-rate stability as a credible
policy. The knowledge that central
banks will deviate from price stability
to pursue an exchange-rate objective
will raise uncertainty about future infla-
tion and could distort savings and
Despite the political appeal of
exchange-market manipulations,
monetary protectionism is unsup-
ported by economic arguments.
Manipulation of nominal exchange
rates has no permanent effect on the
terms of trade and risks inflation.
investment patterns. Similarly, attempts
to maintain nominal exchange rates will
not eliminate exchange-rate uncertainty,
since countries will periodically realign
exchange rates. Hedging exchange risk
will remain an important aspect of inter-
national commerce.
Despite its growing attraction, mon-
etary protectionism is not a product of
floating exchange rates. Monetary pro-
tectionism can result anytime that a
government lacks a strict monetary con-
stitution and will accept nonmarket
criteria for exchange rates. In principle,
a gold standard or a fixed exchange-
rate regime, both of which tie money
supplies closely to the flow of interna-
tional reserves, should limit the scope
for monetary protectionism. In prac-
tice, however, neither system precludes
adjustments of exchange-rate pegs.
The competitive depreciations in the
1930s offer an example of such
monetary protectionism.
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Monetary Protectionism
Interventionists often portray exchange
rates as excessively volatile and
misaligned, characteristics symptomatic
of "market uncertainty" or "market dis-
order," resulting from imperfect infor-
mation. Exchange markets, like other
asset markets, are highly efficient
processors of information and pay sub-
stantial rewards for investments in
knowledge. At times, government
authorities can possess better informa-
tion than the market; for example, when
they contemplate policy surprises.
Usually, however, market participants
and government bureaucrats receive
and respond to the same information.
The interventionists' characterization
of exchange rates as misaligned pre-
sumes that they know the equilibrium
exchange-rate path. Theoretically, a
sustainable equilibrium exchange-rate
path is consistent with our concept of
general equilibrium—simultaneous
clearing in all markets. Unfortunately,
economists simply lack sufficient
knowledge to specify accurately such
an equilibrium path for a sophisticated,
dynamic economy. Failing this, inter-
ventionists designate equilibrium
values in terms of a limited set of "fun-
damentals" that they hope will track
the general-equilibrium path sufficient-
ly well enough that a policy of forcing
market rates to this path will increase
economic welfare.
We are highly skeptical of such efforts.
Most often, analysts specify the equi-
librium exchange-rate path in terms of
purchasing power parity or in terms of a
stable current-account balance—one
equal to "normal" capital flows. Be-
sides the obviously formidable techni-
cal problems associated with this
approach, the relationships between
nominal exchange rates and the current-
account balance and between nominal
exchange rates and price indexes need
not remain stable over time.
In truth, governments lack better infor-
mation than the market about what con-
stitutes the equilibrium exchange-rate
path. Under these circumstances, at-
tempts to force the exchange rate to a
designated equilibrium are unlikely to
enhance economic welfare.
Building on the idea that exchange
rates should respond to trade flows, a
second interventionist theme justifies
active manipulation of exchange rates
as a means of fostering international
adjustment when prices, most notably
wages in the deficit country, are
"sticky"-slow to adjust to prevailing
economic conditions. A real deprecia-
tion is particularly necessary, because
strong propensities to spend in home
markets reduce the effectiveness of
income-adjustment policies. With
sticky prices, a nominal depreciation
alters the terms of trade, offering a
necessary incentive to switch the
global pattern of expenditures.
The key here is an "active manipula-
tion" of nominal exchange rates. Float-
ing rates can indeed promote efficiency
and aid in international adjustment,
especially when prices are sticky. For
example, an increase in foreign demand
for U.S. goods produces a dollar appre-
ciation, which dampens that demand.
Such exchange-rate adjustments pro-
mote mutually beneficial trades and
thereby enhance economic welfare.
The activist view, however, rejects float-
ing rates because they can permit large,
persistent current-account deficits. This
approach assumes that current-account
deficits are disequilibrium responses to
policy errors, which market imperfec-
tions aggravate. In contrast, recent work
questions this approach by suggesting
that large current-account deficits can
be an equilibrium attempt to smooth
consumption over time.
We previously addressed the most im-
portant criticism of this "activist" view.
Trade flows depend on real exchange
rates. Monetary-induced changes in
nominal exchange rates will alter real
rates only temporarily, to the extent
that prices are slow to adjust. In the
long term, monetary policy cannot alter
real exchange rates.
Another recent justification for mone-
tary protectionism stems from alleged
inefficiencies in government macroeco-
nomic policymaking. Because a few,
very large countries dominate interna-
tional macroeconomic policy, the
actions of any one may have signifi-
cant spillover effects on all other
nations. Through policy coordination,
governments can internalize these spill-
over effects and achieve superior pol-
icy choices. Many of the recent calls
for fixed exchange rates or target zones
stem from policy coordination argu-
ments.
In contrast to the appealing theoretical
arguments for policy coordination, em-
pirical studies find only small gains and
suggest that policy spillovers are not
critical to the economic well-being of
the largest industrial countries. A major
argument against attempting to achieve
these small gains is that we lack suffi-
cient knowledge about the nature of in-
ternational economic interactions to
agree on a specific model and on a
properly coordinated policy stance. This
uncertainty about the true economic
model raises questions about the
stability of institutions for coordination
and, more basically, about the ability of
policy coordination to enhance welfare.
• The Political Economy of
Monetary Protectionism
The interventionist literature assumes
that governments always act in soci-
ety's best interest. In contrast, a rich
literature on political economy charac-
terizes elected officials as seeking their
own self-interest. Politicians and
bureaucrats attempt to extend the scope
of their political influence by respond-
ing to the demands of the most politi-
cally active (voting) constituencies.
This literature has offered important
insights into traditional protectionism.
What follows are some thoughts on
similar elements relating to monetary
protectionism.
Elected officials might find exchange-
rate manipulation attractive because it
defers criticism while buying time for
more fundamental actions. By 1985,
for example, dollar exchange rateswere at their zenith, and the U.S. cur-
rent account was deteriorating rapidly.
U.S. manufacturers, facing increasing-
ly stiff competition worldwide, be-
sieged Congress for trade legislation.
Most important, analysts increasingly
linked the deterioration in the external
accounts with fiscal policies of the ad-
ministration and Congress. The oppor-
tunity cost of government inaction,
measured in terms of votes lost,
seemed to rise sharply.
The administration realized that the
U.S. current-account deficit reflected
imbalances between savings and invest-
ment in the United States and in West
Germany and Japan. Governments,
however, cannot easily redress such
structural relationships through fiscal
policies because of strong vested inter-
ests in maintaining various tax and ex-
penditure patterns.
Lacking an ability to address these struc-
tural problems directly and quickly,
policymakers might resort to
exchange-market intervention, chiefly
to buy time for more fundamental ad-
justments and to defer criticism. When
coordinated through the Group of
Seven, such intervention offers a highly
visible signal that governments are
responding to the wishes of their con-
stituencies.
In addition to simply buying time, ex-
change-rate policies can offer tem-
porary benefits to specific constituen-
cies. When goods prices adjust slowly,
a nominal currency depreciation is
equivalent to a temporary, across-the-
board tax on imports and a subsidy to
exports. Political constituencies in the
traded-goods sectors can realize bene-
fits from monetary protectionism sim-
ilar to those afforded by commercial
policies. Ultimately, any benefits from
monetary protectionism will dissipate
with a higher inflation rate and with a
reduced credibility of monetary policy,
but the inflation costs of monetary
protectionism are dispersed across a
wider spectrum of individuals and over
a longer time horizon than the tempo-
rary benefits. Usually, then, constituen-
cies benefiting from monetary protec-
tionism (exporting and import-
competing firms) will be politically
more cohesive and forceful than any
constituency for price stability. For this
reason, a policy that seems economical-
ly myopic can be politically farsighted.
Direct restraints, like tariffs and quotas,
seem increasingly difficult for legis-
lators to enact. Even those who seek
restraints recognize that as a general
policy, protectionism is costly and inef-
ficient. Perhaps more important, how-
ever, Congress faces a growing anti-
protectionist lobby.
6 Multinational
firms and domestic exporters fear that
U.S. trade sanctions could trigger
foreign retaliation. Domestic importers
of consumer goods and firms that use
traded goods as component parts face
higher costs because of import
restraints. In addition, traditional im-
port restraints often violate existing
treaties or tend to compromise other
types of foreign-policy initiatives.
Another seemingly attractive aspect of
monetary protectionism is that Con-
gress and the administration can justify
it in terms of broad macroeconomic con-
siderations, such as exchange-rate
"misalignment" or current-account
"imbalance," rather than industry-
specific considerations, such as auto-
mobile and steel employment. Conse-
quently, interest-group-serving aspects
of monetary protectionism are less ob-
vious than those of commercial policies
and, if justified in terms of macro-
economics, monetary protectionism
runs less risk of foreign retaliation.
Exchange-rate targets also foster
macroeconomic policy collusion
among governments. Such collusion
provides tacit foreign approval of these
policies and limits the probability that
a foreign government will take steps to
neutralize the exchange policies of
another. In addition, coordinated efforts
to fix exchange rates can allow indi-
vidual countries to influence the poli-
cies of others and to defer some of the
adjustment burdens of maintaining the
peg. Such mechanisms are found in the
European Monetary System and figure
in some proposals for target zones and
for fixed exchange rates.
Governments might also find interven-
tion to limit exchange-rate fluctuations
attractive because it eliminates an
important, immediate barometer of the
market's opinion of government poli-
cies. Governments seem to have a
higher tolerance for inflation than the
general public and attempt to exploit
short-term stickiness in prices for a
higher rate of output and employment.
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Collusion to fix exchange rates tempo-
rarily blunts the exchange-rate reaction
to inflationary policies, lessening the
near-term political cost of such policies.
Finally, exchange-rate policies might
provide elected officials with greater
influence over independent central
banks. Exchange-rate policy often falls
under the purview of treasuries and
finance ministries, but its success re-
quires the participation of central
banks. As is well documented, steril-
ized exchange-rate intervention has no
lasting effects on exchange rates. For
their part, central banks often are will-
ing participants, viewing exchange-rate
management as a legitimate aim of
monetary policy. Exchange-rate move-
ments can impart useful information
for policymaking and, as already noted,
exchange-rate targets sometimes can be
consistent with a monetary policy of
price stability.
As often as not, however, exchange-rate
policies conflict with price stability. For
example, U.S. intervention sales of dol-
lars in early 1989 seemed inconsistent
with a goal of price stability and actions
to slow money growth. When these
objectives conflict, the autonomous
central banks face a dilemma between
their mandate of policy independence
and their accountability to the broad na-
tional policy goals set by their govern-
ments. The Federal Reserve System, for
example, does not wish to appear un-
responsive in the eyes of the public to
the wishes of the Congress and the ad-
ministration. As economist Herbert
Stein recently noted, "Despite all the
formal provisions for its independence,
the Fed seems constantly to feel that ifit uses its independence too freely it
will lose it."
Central banks might also participate in
the hopes of influencing a policy that
otherwise would be out of their pur-
view. This channel of influence, how-
ever, runs two ways. Interventionist
policies might enable fiscal agents to
extend their influence beyond the
exchange market to domestic monetary
policy. Elected officials often seek
easier monetary policy than central
banks, hoping to lower interest rates
and to stimulate real growth and
employment. In choosing a nominal
exchange-rate target, engaging in inter-
vention, and encouraging the central
bank not to sterilize the interventions,
fiscal agents have a mechanism for such
an influence. This channel of influence
would not always be open. At times,
however, such as when the central-bank
policy committee is not in unanimous
agreement, such an influence, marginal
though it may be, could prove decisive
in charting future monetary policy.
• Conclusion
We have attempted to instill a healthy
skepticism for exchange-market manip-
ulation, arguing that monetary protec-
tionism is not grounded in widely sup-
ported economic evidence of market
failure and, therefore, that it is unlikely
to enhance economic welfare. Instead,
monetary protectionism stems, as a
near-term palliative, from the political
interactions of policymakers and con-
stituencies with vested interests in par-
ticular market outcomes. Any interna-
tional monetary order willing to accept
nonmarket criteria for exchange rates
and failing to bind governments with
monetary constitutions is ripe for
monetary protectionism.
To counter the political incentives
toward monetary protectionism, we
urge nations to adopt monetary direc-
tives along lines similar to the Neal
Resolution in the United States, which
focuses monetary policy on achieving
long-term price stability. This would
do more for eliminating exchange-
market uncertainty and for fostering
the efficient worldwide use of real
resources than any program to manipu-
late nominal exchange rates.
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